Abstract. Traditional wisdom has it that the better a theory compresses the learning data concerning some phenomenon under investigation, the better we learn, generalize, and the better the theory predicts unknown data. This belief is vindicated in practice but apparently has not been rigorously proved in a general setting. Making these ideas rigorous involves the length of the shortest e ective description of an individual object: its Kolmogorov complexity. In a previous paper we have shown that optimal compression is almost always a best strategy in hypotheses identi cation (an ideal form of the minimum description length (MDL) principle). Whereas the single best hypothesis does not necessarily give the best prediction, we demonstrate that nonetheless compression is almost always the best strategy in prediction methods in the style of R. Solomono .
Introduction
Given a body of data concerning some phenomenon under investigation, we want to select the most plausible hypothesis from among all appropriate hypotheses, or predict future data.`Occam's razor' tells us that, all other things being equal, the simplest explanation is the most likely one. Interpreting`simplest' as`having shortest description', the most likely hypothesis is the most compressed one. Traditional wisdom says that improved compression of the learning data samples leads to better generalization properties and better prediction on unseen data. The length of the shortest e ective description of some object is its Kolmogorov complexity. The argument says that among all \appropriate" hypotheses the one of least Kolmogorov complexity is the most likely one. In 8] we have rigorously demonstrated that this piece of traditional wisdom is \almost always" valid. This shows that compression is good for hypothesis selection. But is it also good for prediction?
The best single hypothesis does not necessarily give the best prediction. For example, consider a situation where we are given a coin of unknown bias p of coming up \heads" which is either p 1 = 1 3 or p 2 = 2 3 . Suppose we have determined that there is probability 2 3 that p = p 1 and probability 1 3 that p = p 2 . Then the \best" hypothesis is the most likely one: p = p 1 which predicts a next outcome \heads" as having probability 1 3 . Yet the best prediction is that this probability is the expectation of throwing \heads" which is 2 3 p 1 + 1 3 p 2 = 4 9 :
Thus, the fact that compression is good for hypothesis identi cation problems does not imply that compression is good for prediction. We analyse the relation between compression of the data sample and prediction in the very general setting of R. Solomono 14, 15] . We explain Solomono 's prediction method using the universal distribution. We show that this method is not equivalent to the use of shortest descriptions. Nonetheless, we demonstrate that compression of descriptions almost always gives optimal prediction.
Background and Previous Work
The classical method for induction is Bayes's rule. The problem with applying Bayes's rule is that one requires the prior probabilities of the hypotheses rst. Unfortunately, it is often impossible to obtain these. In the unlikely case that we possess the true prior distribution, in practice the data tend to be noisy due to the measuring process or other causes. The latter confuses Bayes's rule into over tting the hypothesis by adding random features while trying to t the data.
One way out of the conundrum of a priori probabilities is to require prediction or inference of hypotheses to be completely or primarily data driven. For prediction this was achieved using the Kolmogorov complexity based universal distribution, 14, 15] , and for hypothesis identi cation by the minimum description length (MDL or MML) approach, 10, 11, 19, 20] Ideally, the description lengths involved should be the shortest e ective description lengths. (We use`e ective' in the sense of`Turing computable', 16].) Shortest e ective description length is asymptotically unique and objective and known as the Kolmogorov complexity of the object being described. Such shortest e ective descriptions are`e ective' in the sense that we can compute the described objects from them. Unfortunately, it can be shown, see 6] , that one cannot compute the length of a shortest description from the object being described. This obviously impedes actual use. Instead, one needs to consider computable approximations to shortest descriptions, for example by restricting the allowable approximation time. This course is followed in one sense or another in the practical incarnations such as MML and MDL. There one often uses simply entropy, it does not distinguish the regular elements of a probability ensemble from the random ones.
The code of the shortest e ective descriptions, with the Kolmogorov complexities as the code word length set, also gives an expected code word length close to the entropy yet compresses the regular objects until all regularity is squeezed out. All shortest e ective descriptions are completely random themselves, without any regularity whatsoever. Kolmogorov complexity can be used to develop a theory of (idealized) minimum description length reasoning. In particular, shortest e ective descriptions enable us to rigorously analyse the relation between shortest description length reasoning and Bayesianism. This provides a theoretical basis for, and gives con dence in, practical uses of the various forms of minimum description length reasoning mentioned.
In 7, 8] we rigorously derived and justify this Kolmogorov complexity based form of minimum description length,`Ideal MDL', via the Bayesian approach using a particular prior distribution over the hypotheses (the so-called`universal distribution'). This leads to a mathematical explanation of correspondences and di erences between Ideal MDL and Bayesian reasoning, and in particular it gives some evidence under what conditions the latter is prone to over tting while the former isn't. Namely, for hypothesis identi cation Ideal MDL using Kolmogorov complexity can be reduced to the Bayesian approach using the universal prior distribution, provided the minimum description length is reached for those hypotheses with respect to which the data sample is individually random in the sense of Martin-L of, 9]. Under those conditions Ideal MDL, Bayesianism, MDL, and MML, select pretty much the same hypothesis. These conditions hold for almost all combinations of hypothesis and data sample. Consequently, we showed that the hypothesis that compresses the data sample most is almost always the \best" hypothesis.
Roots of Kolmogorov Complexity

A Lacuna of Classical Probability Theory
An adversary claims to have a true random coin and invites us to bet on the outcome. The coin produces a hundred heads in a row. We say that the coin cannot be fair. The adversary, however, appeals to probability theory which says that each sequence of outcomes of a hundred coin ips is equally likely, 1=2 100 , and one sequence had to come up. Probability theory gives us no basis to challenge an outcome after it has happened. We could only exclude unfairness in advance by putting a penalty The rst sequence is regular, but what is the distinction of the second sequence and the third? The third sequence was generated by ipping a quarter. The second sequence is very regular: 0; 1; 00; 01; : : :: The third sequence will pass (pseudo-)randomness tests.
In fact, classical probability theory cannot express the notion of randomness of an individual sequence. It can only express expectations of properties of outcomes of random processes, that is, the expectations of properties of the total set of sequences under some distribution.
Only relatively recently, this problem has found a satisfactory resolution by combining notions of computability and statistics to express the complexity of a nite object. This complexity is the length of the shortest binary program from which the object can be e ectively reconstructed. It may be called the algorithmic information content of the object. This quantity turns out to be an attribute of the object alone, and absolute (in the technical sense of being recursively invariant). It is the Kolmogorov complexity of the object.
A Lacuna of Information Theory
Shannon's classical information theory assigns a quantity of information to an ensemble of possible messages. All messages in the ensemble being equally probable, this quantity is the number of bits needed to count all possibilities. This expresses the fact that each message in the ensemble can be communicated using this number of bits. However, it does not say anything about the number of bits needed to convey any individual message in the ensemble. To illustrate this, consider the ensemble consisting of all binary strings of length 9999999999999999. By Shannon's measure, we require 9999999999999999 bits on the average to encode a string in such an ensemble. However, the string consisting of 999999999-9999999 1's can be encoded in about 55 bits by expressing 9999999999999999 in binary and adding the repeated pattern`1'. A requirement for this to work is that we have agreed on an algorithm that decodes the encoded string. We can compress the string still further when we note that 9999999999999999 equals 3 2 1111111111111111, and that 1111111111111111 consists of 2 4 1's. Thus, we have discovered an interesting phenomenon: the description of some strings can be compressed considerably, provided they exhibit enough regularity. This observation, of course, is the basis of all systems to express very large numbers and was exploited early on by Archimedes in his treatise The Sand Reckoner, in which he proposes a system to name very large numbers:
\There are some, King Golon, who think that the number of sand is in nite in multitude : : : or] that no number has been named which is great enough to exceed its multitude. : : :] But I will try to show you, by geometrical proofs, which you will be able to follow, that, of the numbers named by me ...] some exceed not only the mass of sand equal in magnitude to the earth lled up in the way described, but also that of a mass equal in magnitude to the universe." However, if regularity is lacking, it becomes more cumbersome to express large numbers. For instance, it seems easier to compress the number`one billion,' than the number`one billion seven hundred thirty-ve million two hundred sixty-eight thousand and three hundred ninety-four,' even though they are of the same order of magnitude.
Lacuna in Randomness
In the context of the above discussion, random sequences are sequences that cannot be compressed. Now let us compare this with the common notions of mathematical randomness. To measure randomness, criteria have been developed that certify this quality. Yet, in recognition that they do not measure`true' randomness, we call these criteria`pseudo' randomness tests. For instance, statistical surveys of initial sequences of decimal digits of have failed to disclose any signi cant deviations from randomness. But clearly, this sequence is so regular that it can be described by a simple program to compute it, and this program can be expressed in a few bits.
The notion of randomness of individual objects has a long history which goes back to the initial attempts by von Mises, 17] , to formulate the principles of application of the calculus of probabilities to real-world phenomena. Classical probability theory cannot even express the notion of`randomness of individual objects'. Following almost half a century of unsuccessful attempts, the theory of Kolmogorov complexity, 4] , and Martin-L of tests for randomness, 9], nally succeeded in formally expressing the novel notion of individual randomness in a correct manner, see 6]. Objects which are random in this sense will satisfy all e ective tests for randomness properties|those which are known and those which are yet unknown alike. The emphasis is on binary sequences only for convenience; observations in any alphabet can be so encoded in a way that is`theory neutral'.
A binary string x is a proper pre x of a binary string y if we can write x = yz for z 6 = . A set fx; y; : : :g f0; 1g is pre x-free if for any pair of distinct elements in the set neither is a proper pre x of the other. A pre x-free set is also called a pre x code. Each binary string x = x 1 x 2 : : : x n has a special type of pre x code, called a self-delimiting code, x = x 1 x 1 x 2 x 2 : : : x n :x n ;
where :x n = 0 if x n = 1 and :x n = 1 otherwise. This code is self-delimiting because we can determine where the code word x ends by reading it from left to right without backing up. Using this code we de ne the standard self-delimiting code for x to be x 0 = l(x)x. It is easy to check that l( x) = 2n and l(x 0 ) = n + 2 log n.
Let T 1 ; T 2 ; : : : be a standard enumeration of all Turing machines, and let 1 ; 2 ; : : : be the enumeration of corresponding functions which are computed by the respective Turing machines. That is, T i computes i . These functions are the partial recursive functions or computable functions. The Kolmogorov complexity C(x) of x is the length of the shortest binary program from which x is computed. Formally, we de ne this as follows.
De nition 1. The Kolmogorov complexity of x given y (for free on a special input tape) is C(xjy) = min p;i fl(i 0 p) : i (p; y) = x; p 2 f0; 1g ; i 2 Ng:
The Kolmogorov complexity is absolute in the sense of being recursively invariant by Church's Thesis and the ability of universal machines to simulate one another, 6]. For technical reasons we also need a variant of complexity, socalled pre x complexity, which associated with Turing machines for which the set of programs resulting in a halting computation is pre x free. We can realize this by equiping the Turing machine with a one-way input tape, a separate work tape, and a one-way output tape. Such Turing machines are called pre x machines since the halting programs for anyone of them form a pre x free set. Taking the universal pre x machine U we can de ne the pre x complexity analogously with the plain Kolmogorov complexity. If x is the rst shortest program for x then the set fx : U(x ) = x; x 2 f0; 1g g is a pre x code. That is, each x is a code word for some x, and if x and y are code words for x and y with x 6 = y then x is not a pre x of x.
Let h i be a standard invertible e ective one-one encoding from N N to pre x-free recursive subset of N. For example, we can set hx; yi = x 0 y 0 . We insist on pre x-freeness and recursiveness because we want a universal Turing machine to be able to read an image under h i from left to right and determine where it ends.
De nition 2. The pre x Kolmogorov complexity of x given y (for free) is K(xjy) = min p;i fl(hp; ii) : i (hp; yi) = x; p 2 f0; 1g ; i 2 Ng:
The nice thing about K(x) is that we can interpret 2 ?K(x) as a probability distribution. Namely, K(x) is the length of a shortest pre x-free program for x. By the fundamental Kraft's inequality, see for example 6], we know that if l 1 ; l 2 ; : : : are the code-word lengths of a pre x code, then P x 2 ?lx 1. This leads to the notion of universal distribution|a rigorous form of Occam's razor{below. 4 Universal Distribution A Turing machine T computes a function on the natural numbers. However, we can also consider the computation of real valued functions. For this purpose we consider both the argument of and the value of as a pair of natural numbers according to the standard pairing function h i. We de ne a function from N to the reals R by a Turing machine T computing a function as follows. Interprete the computation (hx; ti) = hp; qi to mean that the quotient p=q is the rational valued tth approxmation of f(x).
De nition 3. A function f : N ! R is enumerable if there is a Turing machine T computing a total function such that (x; t+1) (x; t) and lim t!1 (x; t) = f(x). This means that f can be computably approximated from below. If f can also be computably approximated from above then we call f recursive.
A function P : N ! 0; 1] is a probability distribution if P x2N P(x) 1. (The inequality is a technical convenience. We can consider the surplus probability to be concentrated on the unde ned element u 6 2 N).
Consider the family EP of enumerable probability distributions on the sample space N (equivalently, f0; 1g ). It is known, 6], that EP contains an element m that multiplicatively dominates all elements of EP. That is, for each P 2 EP there is a constant c such that c m(x) > P(x) for all x 2 N. We call m a universal distribution.
The family EP contains all distributions with computable parameters which have a name, or in which we could conceivably be interested, or which have ever been considered. The dominating property means that m assigns at least as much probability to each object as any other distribution in the family EP does.
In this sense it is a universal a priori by accounting for maximal ignorance. It turns out that if the true a priori distribution in Bayes's Rule is recursive, then using the single distribution m, or its continuous analogue the measure M on the sample space f0; 1g 1 (de ned later), is provably as good as using the true a priori distribution.
We also know, 6], that
Lemma4.
That means that m assigns high probability to simple objects and low probability to complex or random objects. For example, for x = 00 : : :0 (n 0's) we have K(x) = K(n) + O(1) log n + 2 log log n + O(1) since the program print n times a`0' prints x. (The additional 2 log log n term is the penalty term for a self-delimiting encoding.) Then, 1=(n log 2 n) = O(m(x)). But if we ip a coin to obtain a string y of n bits, then with overwhelming probability K(y) n ? O(1) (because y does not contain e ective regularities which allow compression), and hence m(y) = O(1=2 n ).
Example: Betting Against a Crooked Player
Let us apply this to the betting problem on a not-known-to-be false coin we identi ed in Section 2.1 as a lacuna in probability theory.
Alice, walking down the street, comes across Bob, who is tossing a coin. He is o ering odds to all passers-by on whether the next toss will be heads or tails. The pitch is this: he'll pay you two dollars if the next toss is heads; you pay him one dollar if the next toss is tails. Should she take the bet? If Bob is tossing a fair coin, it's a great bet. Probably she'll win money in the long run. After all, she would expect that half Bob's tosses would come up heads and half tails. Giving up only one dollar on each heads toss and getting two for each tails|why in a while she'd be rich! Of course, to assume that a street hustler is tossing a fair coin is a bit of a stretch, and Alice is no dummy. So she watches for a while, recording how the c oin comes up for other betters, writing down a`1' for`heads' and a`0' for`ta ils'. After a while she has written 01010101010101. This doesn't look good. So Alice makes the following o er.
Alice dollars for a sequence like 0101010101... ! In the 1 versus 2 dollars scheme, Alice can propose to add this as an extra bonus pay. This way, she is guaranteed to win big: either polynomially increase her money (when Bob does not cheat) or exponentially increase her money (when Bob cheats).
Randomness Tests
One can consider those objects as nonrandom in which one can nd su ciently many regularities. In other words, we would like to identify`incompressibility' with`randomness'. This is proper if the sequences that are incompressible can be shown to possess the various properties of randomness (stochasticity) known from the theory of probability. That this is possible is the substance of the celebrated theory developed by the Swedish mathematician Per Martin-L of.
There are many properties known which probability theory attributes to random objects. To give an example, consider sequences of n tosses with a fair coin. Each sequence of n zeros and ones is equiprobable as an outcome: its probability is 2 ?n . If such a sequence is to be random in the sense of a proposed new de nition, then the number of ones in x should be near to n=2, the number of occurrences of blocks`00' should be close to n=4, and so on.
It is not di cult to show that each such single property separately holds for all incompressible binary strings. But we want to demonstrate that incompressibility implies all conceivable e ectively testable properties of randomness (both the known ones and the as yet unknown ones). This way, the various theorems in probability theory about random sequences carry over automatically to incompressible sequences. We do not develop the theory here but refer to the exhaustive treatment in 6] instead. We shall use the properties required in the sequel of this paper.
Bayesian Reasoning
Consider a situation in which one has a set of observations of some phenomenon, and also a nite or countably in nite set of hypotheses which are candidates to explain the phenomenon. For example, we are given a coin and we ip it 1000 times. We want to identify the probability that the coin has outcome`head' in a single coin ip. That is, we want to nd the bias of the coin. The set of possible hypotheses is uncountably in nite if we allow each real bias in 0; 1], and countably in nite if we allow each rational bias in 0; 1].
For each hypothesis H we would like to assess the probability that H is thè true' hypothesis, given the observation of D. This quantity, Pr(HjD), can be described and manipulated formally in the following way. (2) 3 Some Bayesians prefer replacing Pr(DjH)P (H) by a joint probability of data and hypotheses together, the prior P (D; H) = Pr(DjH)P (H). The prior probability P(H) is often considered as the learner's initial degree of belief in hypothesis H. In essence Bayes's rule is a mapping from a priori probability P(H) to a posteriori probability Pr(HjD) determined by data D.
Continuing to obtain more and more data, this way the total inferred probability will concentrate more and more on the`true' hypothesis. We can draw the same conclusion of course, using more examples, by the law of large numbers. In general, the problem is not so much that in the limit the inferred probability would not concentrate on the true hypothesis, but that the inferred probability gives as much information as possible about the possible hypotheses from only a limited number of data. Given the prior probability of the hypotheses, it is easy to obtain the inferred probability, and therefore to make informed decisions. However, in general we don't know the prior probabilities. The following MDL approach in some sense replaces an unknown prior probability by a xed universal' probability.
Prediction by Compression
Theoretically the idea of predicting time sequences using shortest e ective descriptions was rst formulated by R. Solomono , 14] . He uses Bayes's formula equipped with a xed`universal' prior distribution. In accordance with Occam's dictum, it tells us to go for the explanation that compresses the data the most| but not quite as we shall show.
The aim is to predict outcomes concerning a phenomenon under investigation. In this case we have some prior evidence (prior distribution over the hypotheses, experimental data) and we want to predict future events. This situation can be modelled by considering a sample space S of one-way in nite sequences of basic elements B de ned by S = B 1 . We assume a prior distribution over S with (x) denoting the probability of a sequence starting with x. Given a previously observed data string x, the inference problem is to predict the next symbol in the output sequence, that is, to extrapolate the sequence x. In terms of the variables in formula 2, H xy is the hypothesis that the sequence starts with initial segment xy. Data D x consists of the fact that the sequence starts with initial segment x. Then, Pr(D x jH xy ) = 1, that is, the data is forced by the hypothesis, or Pr(D z jH xy ) = 0 for z is not a pre x of xy, that is, the hypothesis contradicts the data. For P(H xy ) and Pr(D x ) in formula 2 we substitute (xy) and (x), respectively. For P(H xy jD x ) we substitute (yjx). This 4 Traditional notation is` (?x)' instead of` (x)' where cylinder ?x = f! 2 S : ! starts with xg. We use` (x)' for convenience. is a measure if equalities hold.
way the formula is rewritten as (yjx) = (xy) (x) : (3) The nal probability (yjx) is the probability of the next symbol string being y, given the initial string x. Obviously we now only need the prior probability to evaluate (yjx). The goal of inductive inference in general is to be able to either (i) predict, or extrapolate, the next element after x or (ii) to infer an underlying e ective process that generated x, and hence to be able to predict the next symbol. In the most general deterministic case such an e ective process is a Turing machine, but it can also be a probabilistic Turing machine or, say, a Markov process (which makes its brief and single appearance here). The central task of inductive inference is to nd a universally valid approximation to which is good at estimating the conditional probability that a given segment x will be followed by a segment y.
In general this is impossible. But suppose we restrict the class of priors to the recursive semimeasures and restrict the set of basic elements B to f0; 1g.
Under this relatively mild restriction on the admissible semimeasures , it turns out that we can use the single universal semimeasure M as a`universal prior' (replacing the real prior ) for prediction. The notion of universal semimeasure M is very suitable for prediction. Let S n be the -expected value of the square of the di erence in -probability and M-probability of 0 occurring at the nth
We may call S n the expected squared error at the nth prediction.
Theorem5. Let be a recursive semimeasure. Using the notation above, P n S n k=2 with k = K( ) ln 2. (Hence, S n converges to 0 faster than 1=n.)
A proof using Kulback-Leibler divergence is given in 6]. There it is additionally demonstrated that for almost all unbounded x the conditional probability of M converges to the conditional probability of . Note that while the following Theorem does imply the convergence of the conditional probabilities similarly to Theorem 5, it does not imply the speed of convergence estimate. Conversely, Theorem 5 does not imply the following. with -probability one. In in nite sequences ! with pre xes x satisfying the displayed asymptotics are precisely the -random sequences.
Proof. We use an approach based on the Submartingale Convergence Theorem, 1] pp. 324-325, which states that the following property holds for each sequence of random variables ! 1 ; ! 2 ; : : :. If f(! 1:n ) is a -submartingale, and the -expectation Ejf(! 1:n )j < 1, then it follows that lim n!1 f(! 1:n ) exists with -probability one.
In our case,
is a -submartingale, and the -expectation Et(! 1:n j ) 1. Therefore, there is a set A B 1 with (A) = 1, such that for each ! 2 A the limit lim n!1 t(! 1:n j ) < 1: These are the -random !'s by Corollary 4. There are two possibilities to associate complexities with machines. The rst possibility is to take the length of the shortest program, while the second possibility is to take the negative logarithm of the universal probability. In the discrete case, using pre x machines, these turned out to be the same by the Coding Theorem 4. In the continuous case, using monotone machines, it turns out they are di erent.
De nition 7. The complexity KM is de ned as
In contrast with C and K complexities, in the above de nition the greatest pre x-free subset of all programs which produce output starting with x on the reference monotone machine U are weighed.
De nition 8. Let U be the reference monotone machine. The complexity Km, Lemma9.
This shows that the di erences between Km(x) and KM (x) must in some sense be very small. (ii) There exists a function f(n) which goes to in nity with n ! 1 such that Km(x) ? KM (x) Together this shows the following. Given xy that is a pre x of a (possibly not -random) !, optimal prediction of xed length extrapolation y from an unboundedly growing pre x x of ! need not necessarily be reached by the shortest programs for xy and x minimizing Km(xy) ? Km(x), but is reached by considering the weighted version of all programs for xy and x which is represented by ? log M(xy) + log M(x) = (Km(xy) ? g(xy)) ? (Km(x) ? g(x)):
Here g(x) is a function which can rise to in between the inverse of the Ackermann function and Km(l(x)) log log x|but only in case x is not -random.
Therefore, for certain x and y which are not -random, optimization using the minimum length programs may result in very incorrect predictions. However, for -random x we have that ? log M(x) and Km(x) coincide up to an additional constant independent of x, that is, g(xy) = g(x) = O(1), Lemma 
Hypothesis Identi cation and Compression
We brie y mention the related work on hypothesis identi cation and compression. The so-called minimum description length principle is an algorithmic paradigm that is widely applied. That is, it is widely applied at least in spirit; to apply it literally may run in computation di culties since it involves nding an optimum in a exponentially large set of candidates as noted for example in 6]. Yet in some cases one can approximate this optimum, 18, 21] . For the theoretical case where the minimum description lengths involved are the Kolmogorov complexities, we mathematically derived the minimum description length paradigm from rst principles, that is, Bayes's rule, 6, 7, 8] . To do so we needed auxiliary notions of universal distribution and Martin-L of tests for randomness of individual objects. Before proceeding it is useful to point out that the idea of a two-part code for a body of data D is natural from the perspective of Kolmogorov complexity. If D does not contain any regularities at all, then it consists of purely random data and there is no hypothesis to identify. Assume that the body of data D contains regularities. With help of a description of those regularities (a model) we can describe the data compactly. Assuming that the regularities can be represented in an e ective manner (that is, by a Turing machine), we encode the data as a program for that machine. Squeezing all e ective regularity out of the data, we end up with a Turing machine representing the meaningful regular information in the data together with a program for that Turing machine representing the remaining meaningless randomness of the data. This is the intuition, which nds its basis in the De nitions 1 and 2. However, it is di cult to nd a valid mathematical way to force a sensible division of the information at hand in a meaningful part and a meaningless part. One way to proceed is suggested by the analysis below.
A practice oriented theory like MDL, although often lacking in justi cation, apparently works and is used by practitioners. The MDL principle is very easy to use in some loose sense, but it is hard to justify. A user of the MDL principle does not need to prove that the concept class concerned is learnable, rather he needs to choose a concept that can be described shortly and without causing too many errors (and he needs to balance these two things).
In various forms aimed at practical applications the idea of doing induction or data modelling in statistical hypothesis identi cation or prediction was proposed by C. Wallace and co-authors 19, 20] , who formulated the Minimum Message Length (MML) principle and J. Rissanen 10, 11] who formulated the Minimum Description Length (MDL) principle. Here we abstract away from epistemological and technical di erences between MML and MDL, and other variants, and their concessions to reality in the name of feasibility and practicability. We focus only on the following central ideal version involved. Indeed, we do not even care about whether we deal with statistical or deterministic hypotheses. All e ectively describable hypotheses are involved.
De nition 13. Given a sample of data, and an e ective enumeration of models, ideal MDL selects the model which minimizes the sum of { the length, in bits, of an e ective description of the model; and { the length, in bits, of an e ective description of the data when encoded with the help of the model. Intuitively, with a more complex description of the hypothesis H, it may t the data better and therefore decreases the misclassi ed data. If H describes all the data, then it does not allow for measuring errors. A simpler description of H may be penalized by increasing the number of misclassi ed data. If H is a trivial hypothesis that contains nothing, then all data are described literally and there is no generalization. The rationale of the method is that a balance in between seems required. Similarly to the analysis of prediction above, in 7, 8] we have shown that in almost all cases maximal compression nds the best hypotehsis.
Conclusion
The analysis of both hypothesis identi cation by Ideal MDL and prediction shows that maximally compressed descriptions give good results on the data samples which are random with respect to probabilistic hypotheses. These data samples form the overwhelming majority and occur with probability going to one when the length of the data sample grows unboundedly.
